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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of various tariff policies for photovoltaics on the electricity 
distribution bill of residential customers. By means of synthetic load profiles and an average 
Belgian PV generation profile, the bill savings are simulated under different tariff designs, 
including conventional net metering, net metering with an additional capacity-based component, 
purely offtake-related tariffs, combined offtake and injection tariffs, and peak demand tariffs. This 
analysis is conducted on a case study of 7 distribution grid operators in Flanders, Belgium. In 
addition, bill savings are compared for different load profiles and degrees of PV penetration. It is 
found that NEM policies provide no incentive to change the load profile or scale the PV system in 
such a way that grid interaction and peak demand are minimized. The results suggest that pure 
offtake tariffs, combined offtake and injection tariffs and peak demand tariffs are better suited to 
incentivize lower grid interaction and peak demand, because marginal benefits of additional PV 
capacity decrease for high levels of PV penetration. Lastly, the results indicate that the ability of 
PV systems to reduce peak demand and grid interaction of an average Flemish household is 
limited. 
Keywords: distribution grid tariffs, cost allocation, rooftop photovoltaic generation, net metering, 
capacity-based tariff 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
Historically, the allocation of electricity distribution costs to grid users has always been subject to 
a degree of economic inefficiency, in the sense that users do not carry a share of the costs that 
perfectly reflects their contribution in causing these costs. In economic theory, the optimal setting 
of prices for use of infrastructures which are too costly to duplicate is a well-studied and much 
debated issue, first addressed by economists in the context of bridge tolls (Dupuit, 1849). Many 
theorists in the early twentieth century advocated marginal-cost pricing as the most allocative 
efficient pricing method to maximize social welfare, including Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) 
who apply it to road taxation in the presence of congestion, and Hotelling (1938) in the context of 
public utilities. 
There are various reasons why tariff methodologies for distribution grid operators (DSOs) deviate 
from this theory in practice. First, the DSO is a textbook example of a natural monopoly (Baldwin, 
et al., 2011) and marginal-cost pricing is shown to be financially unfeasible for natural monopolies 
who are characterized by economies of scale and a significant share of fixed costs (Kahn, 1988). 
Second, it may not be consistent with other objectives of policy makers and regulators, such as 
non-discrimination, regulatory stability and simplicity. As a result, a substantial part of 
distribution grid costs is traditionally allocated on the basis of energy offtake, or as a fixed yearly 
charge, with little or no attention to other cost determinants such as time of use or contribution 
to peak load. 
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Nowadays, the historical problems related to economic efficiency of cost allocation in distribution 
grids are amplified due to the increasing integration of distributed and renewable generation into 
the low-voltage grids. Between 2002 and 2012, total solar generation in the EU-28 rose from 0.3 
TWh to 71.0 TWh, and its contribution to renewable generation rose from 0.1% to 10.5% 
(Eurostat, 2014). By the end of 2013, installed PV capacity amounted to 78.8 GWp, with an output 
of 80,2 TWh (≈ 2.4% of annual EU generation) (Eurobserv, 2014). In many regions, solar 
photovoltaic (PV) panels have become widespread among residential customer-generators, here 
referred to as ‘prosumers’. Distributed generation (DG) is challenging DSOs in several ways. On 
the one hand, there are technical challenges, such as congestion management and voltage control 
when dealing with reverse power flows and local injection peaks. On the other hand, there is a 
regulatory challenge in finding a sound balance between promoting renewable DG and demanding 
a fair contribution of DG for usage of the grid. 
This paper aims to quantify the impact of residential PV on the annual electricity distribution bill.1 
The potential bill savings are simulated and compared under different PV tariff policies, PV 
penetration levels, load profiles. From the perspective of the DSO, these bill savings are a measure 
for the premium given to PV generation, which is, ceteris paribus, paid by other grid users. The 
bill savings are simulated using the current tariff schemes of 7 Flemish DSOs. In particular, 5 
distinct tariff policies for PV are analyzed: conventional net metering, net metering with an 
additional capacity-based component, purely offtake-related tariffs, offtake and injection tariffs, 
and peak load tariffs. The emphasis of this work lies on the comparison of the behavior of the 
different tariff policies under varying degrees of PV penetration, and under varying load profiles. 
While several authors have already explored the bill saving potential of PV systems, there has 
been no study on the isolated effect of PV tariff policies on the contribution of residential users to 
the distribution grid costs. This paper fills that gap and quantifies the impact of PV systems on the 
premium given by DSOs to prosumers as opposed to pure consumers. The results of this study are 
of interest to regulators and policymakers who wish to make an impact assessment of different 
solar PV policies on the contribution of PV users to the distribution grid costs, and of the way in 
which these policies behave under changing PV penetration levels. Likewise, the results may assist 
grid users in assessing the value of PV for investment decisions.  
Section 2 provides theoretical background on cost allocation in distribution grids and definitions 
of the main concepts in this paper. In addition, it covers closely related literature, and highlights 
the characteristics of distribution grid tariffs in Flanders. Section 3 describes the input data and 
the methodology. Section 4 summarizes the results for each PV tariff policy, and compares bill 
savings for different values of PV penetration and load profiles. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Cost allocation in theory and in practice 
2.1   Economic regulation versus cost allocation 
Due to the natural monopoly characteristics of electricity networks, the activities of DSOs are 
typically supervised by a regulator (Joskow, 2007). From an economic perspective, two closely 
related types of regulation can be distinguished: economic regulation and cost allocation. The 
objective of economic regulation is generally to create an economic framework for DSOs that 
                                                          
1 In practice, the bill of a residential consumer also has components related to energy, transmission and taxes, 
but these components are not accounted for. This paper focuses on the distribution component. 
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mitigates the negative monopoly effects by mimicking the forces of a competitive environment. In 
practice, this means that the regulator supervises the aggregate costs and revenues of the DSO in 
order to ensure operational efficiency and a reasonable rate of return. Important examples of 
approaches to economic regulation include incentive regulation and cost-of-service regulation 
(Joskow, 2014). Cost allocation, on the other hand, is concerned with the question how the allowed 
costs should be allocated among the grid users. Similarly to economic regulation, this usually 
happens with oversight from regulators who design the tariff structure and other mechanisms 
(e.g. net metering) which can impact the final allocation. The work of Laffont & Tirole (1993) 
constitutes a fundamental reference on the historical development of the theory of monopoly 
pricing. 
2.2   Principles of tariff design 
When designing the distribution grid tariffs, regulators seek a balance between several, often 
conflicting, objectives. Examples of typical principles of tariff design include (Pérez-Arriaga 
(2013), Bonbright (1961)):2 
 Economic efficiency: an efficient allocation is one where goods and services are consumed 
by whoever benefits most from hem. Because prices have an important signaling function, 
they can be designed to incentivize grid usage that is most efficient for the system as a 
whole. Economic theory suggests that this requires prices that reflect marginal costs. This 
closely relates to the concept of cost-causality, which states that customers should be 
charged in accordance with the costs they cause to the system. In this context, economic 
efficiency implies that tariff drivers should represent cost drivers for the DSO. 
 Economic sustainability: often referred to as ‘revenue sufficiency’. Tariffs should be 
designed in such a way that DSOs are capable of recovering their allowed costs in the 
short- and long-term, and of guaranteeing a reasonable rate of return. This principle may 
conflict with the principle of economic efficiency, since optimal economic signals may not 
be financially feasible in the long-term. 
 Non-discrimination: in the context of cost allocation, it is often referred to as ‘equity’. This 
principle states that the same usage of the grid should result in the same bill for different 
grid users. 
 Simplicity: this principle requires that tariff methodologies should be easy to understand 
and to implement. It conflicts with the objective of economic efficiency, because any 
simplification of an economically optimal tariff design ultimately distorts the efficiency of 
the signals given to grid users. 
At the same time, tariff design has to be technically feasible. Tariff drivers have to be objectively 
measurable at the customer side, requiring adequate metering equipment. Most traditional 
electromechanical meters measure the flow of electrical energy (in kWh). They can be 
unidirectional or bi-directional, meaning that the meter can rotate in two directions, depending 
on the direction of the current. Newer, digital meters can register several flows separately and can 
even account for time of use (Hughes & Bell, 2004). 
These design principles and implementation constraints commonly results in the following types 
of charges (Mills, et al., 2008): 
                                                          
2 Other principles include: consistency, transparency, additivity, and stability. 
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 Energy-related charges, based on electricity offtake and/or injection during a pre-specified 
period of time. 
 Capacity-related charges, based on peak offtake and/or injection, or peak capacity of the 
connection. In the context of DG, these charges can also be based on the capacity of the DG 
system. 
 Fixed charges, based on factors not directly related to grid usage. Examples include 
location in the grid (city versus rural) or metering activities. 
One of the greatest challenges in cost allocation today lies in determining the weight given to each 
of these types of charges in recovering the costs of the DSO, while accounting for the design criteria 
mentioned above. Additionally, the question remains how to optimally implement each charge. 
2.3   PV remuneration mechanisms 
Alongside tariff design, other mechanisms exist which impact the allocation of costs among grid 
users. This includes the way in which users are compensated for PV generation. Hughes & Bell 
(2004) provide a taxonomy of various methods for compensation of customer-generators for 
electricity injected into the grid. In Europe, two types of PV compensation are most common: feed-
in tariffs (FIT) and net metering (NEM). Both are designed to accelerate investment in renewable 
generation, but this paper only considers the impact of PV under NEM. 
Most practical applications of FIT policies are characterized by long-term contracts in which the 
renewable generator is guaranteed a certain price, dependent on the underlying cost of the 
generation technology (Couture & Gagnon, 2010). This feed-in price can be, but does not have to 
be, equal to the prevailing retail rate. NEM, on the other hand, can be defined as a service to an 
electric consumer, allowing electric energy provided by the utility to the consumer to be offset by 
electric energy generated by that consumer from an eligible on-site generating facility and 
delivered to the local distribution facilities (FERC, 2005).3 This implies that all local generation is 
credited at the retail rate, which includes the energy price, the grid tariffs for transmission and 
distribution, and the regional and national levies. Any excess generation above local consumption 
(i.e. when the volume of injections exceeds the offtake during the billing period) is typically not 
reimbursed, although some countries allow carrying over excess generation as a credit from one 
billing period to the next, which is commonly referred to as ‘banking’ (Hughes & Bell, 2004). 
An important aspect of NEM is that the temporal correlation between local consumption and 
generation is disregarded. Under a fully volumetric distribution grid tariff, users with the same 
aggregate consumption and generation receive the same bill, regardless of any differences in load 
shape and simultaneity. Charges based on peak demand are more sensitive to this temporal 
correlation, making the benefits of PV less predictable. Some studies already illustrate how the 
value of NEM for PV owners is strongly affected by rate design (Mills, et al., 2008), explaining why 
solar advocates may have a preference for volumetric charges. 
 
 
                                                          
3 In practice, a single, bi-directional meter is commonly used. In the case of NEM, a single, bi-directional meter 
is commonly used to register the electricity consumption of the grid user. When local generation exceeds local 
consumption, electricity is injected into the grid, and the meter runs backwards. The annual bill is then based 
on the difference between the meter readings at the end and the beginning of the year. 
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2.4   Related literature 
Multiple authors have studied the impact of PV systems on peak load and peak load charges. Hoff, 
et al. (1992) show that small PV systems, relative to the maximum building load, can lead to 
significant reductions in energy charges and peak load charges. This analysis is conducted using 
consumption data of an office building, and simulated PV generation profiles. However, it is also 
found that the ability of PV systems to reduce peak load declines substantially as the size of the 
PV system increases, due to a shift of peak demand to moments when PV generation is low. Perez, 
et al. (1997) analyze the ability of PV systems to reduce peak load. The authors find that this peak 
reduction ability is highest in air-conditioned offices. Bhattacharjee and Duffy (2006) analyze the 
payback period of PV systems, and find that the length of this period decreases when peak load 
charges savings are accounted for. Borenstein (2008) attempts to make a complete market 
valuation of solar PV. It is found that the market benefits of PV are much smaller than the costs. In 
addition, the results suggest that installation of solar systems in California does not reduce the 
cost of transmission and distribution infrastructure. 
Other studies examine the relation between rate design and the value of PV systems. Herig and 
Starrs (2002) compare the impact of volumetric versus fixed rates on the value of PV systems. 
Hoff and Margolis (2004) and Pop (2005) compare the impact of time-of-use rates versus flat rates 
on the value of a residential PV system. Johnston, et al. (2005) analyze the impact of standby rates 
on DG. Duke, et al. (2005) study net metering. Firestone, et al. (2006) study the impact of rate 
structure on DG in New York and California. Cooper & Rose (2006) review the status and 
importance of net metering at the state level. Mills, et al. (2008) explore the ability of PV systems 
to create bill savings for commercial customers under a large number of retail rate structures in 
California, comparing multiple actual building loads and PV generation combinations. The authors 
also address the impact of rate switching, and the value of NEM. 
2.5   Cost allocation in Flanders 
In Flanders, the design of distribution grid tariffs is determined by the regional regulator VREG. 
The tariff covers 5 cost components: 
1. Costs related to usage of the grid: this component covers costs which can be attributed to 
the subscribed capacity, the system services and the metering activity. 
 
2. Costs related to public service obligations: this component covers expenses which are 
imposed by the government, such as street lighting, the purchasing of green certificates, 
and the costs of acting as a social electricity supplier toward poor users who are not 
eligible for another supplier. 
 
3. Costs related to supporting services: among other things, this component covers costs due 
to energy losses in the grid. 
 
4. Surcharges: covering the remaining local, regional and federal taxes. 
 
5. Supplementary capacity charge for prosumers with net metering: this is a newly introduced 
tariff component for prosumers under the net metering policy, to compensate for the fact 
that this group generally does not fully contribute to the costs associated with their real 
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electricity offtake, because the meter only visualizes the net-offtake instead of the full 
annual offtake. 
Each of these cost components is recovered through a number of tariff drivers, including energy 
offtake and injection (€/kWh), peak demand (€/kW), PV capacity (€/kW), and fixed charges 
(€/year). Tariffs and tariff structure are dependent on the type of user and the type of metering 
installed. In general, the distribution grid tariffs are heavily volumetric. Furthermore, tariffs are 
strongly focused around energy offtake. Injection tariffs are only compulsory for systems with a 
peak capacity > 10kVA. PV systems below 10 kVA are eligible for a NEM policy. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1   Input data 
This paper uses three types of input data: synthetic load profiles, a PV generation profile, and the 
tariff sheets of Flemish DSOs. Each of these inputs is discussed below. 
A. Synthetic Load Profiles 
Synthetic load profiles (SLPs) are artificial curves, representing the estimated average 
consumption behavior of certain categories of grid users who do not have a meter which registers 
and transmits real-time consumption data. An SLP typically represents consumption on a quarter-
hourly basis, relative to the annual total consumption, and accounting for various determinants, 
such as differences between consumption during the week versus the weekend, and 
climatological and seasonal effects. In this paper, two quarter-hourly SLPs for residential 
households are used, which have the following characteristics: 
𝑆𝐿𝑃1:     
𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
< 1.3 
𝑆𝐿𝑃2:     
𝑁𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
≥ 1.3 
These SLPs are applicable to the year 2015, and were constructed by Synergrid, the federation of 
Belgian grid operators for electricity and gas (VREG, 2015). SLP1 is the consumption profile of an 
average residential consumer in Flanders. SLP2 is the average consumption profile of residential 
consumers who consume relatively more at night. These are typically users who have a contract 
for separate day- and night-rates with their supplier. In both cases, an annual electricity 
consumption of 3500 kWh is assumed.4 Figure 1 illustrates the difference in load shape between 
SLP1 and SLP2. 
 
                                                          
4 3.500 kWh is the annual consumption of an average Flemish household consisting of two parents with one 
child, assuming no electric heating (VREG, 2015) 
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FIGURE 1: Comparison of load profile shape between SLP1 and SLP2. 
B. PV generation profiles 
The Belgian transmission system operator (TSO) Elia publishes country-wide generation data for 
various technologies connected to the Belgian electricity grids, including solar generation (Elia, 
2015). For each quarter-hour interval of the year 2013, both the monitored capacity (MW) of each 
technology, and the average momentary measurement (MW) are known. From this, we derive the 
PV output profile. In what follows, this profile is referred to as ‘PV2013’.5 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡(%) =
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑊)
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡(𝑀𝑊)
 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (= 1,2, … ,35040) 
In order to translate this into a more practical physical quantity, such as power (kW) or energy 
(kWh), one needs to know the size of the PV system in terms of its peak capacity (kW). By changing 
the peak capacity of the installation, it is possible to up- or downscale the generation profile. 
However, in this paper PV penetration is used as an input parameter to represent and scale the 
size of the PV system, instead of peak capacity. PV penetration can be defined as follows:6 
𝑃𝑉 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (%) =  
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑘𝑊ℎ)
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑘𝑊ℎ)
 
By combining PV2013 with SLP1 and SLP2 respectively, it is possible to create two separate 
consumption-generation scenarios, and to compare the way in which both interact with the 
electricity distribution grid. Figure 2 summarizes some important characteristics of these 
combinations with respect to electrical energy flows. Figure 3 visualizes the ability of PV systems 
to reduce peak demand. The following observations can be made: 
 Annual offtake: electricity offtake during each 15-minute interval can be defined as 
follows:7 
                                                          
5 In other words, it is assumed that every solar PV system in the country has the same relative output, 
averaging out differences in local weather conditions, technological differences, and differences in orientation 
and angle of the system. 
 
6 Note that in this paper, only PV penetration between 0% and 100% are considered. 
 
7 By this definition, any injection of electricity into the distribution grid is simply a negative offtake. 
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𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡(𝑘𝑊ℎ) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡(𝑘𝑊ℎ) − 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡(𝑘𝑊ℎ) 
 
The upper left graph in Figure 2 visualizes the annual offtake for PV penetration levels 
between 0% and 100%, which is defined as: 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒(𝑘𝑊ℎ) = ∑ 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡(𝑘𝑊ℎ)[𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡 > 0]
𝑡
 
It can be observed that for small levels of PV penetration, both SLPs have the same offtake 
behavior. In both cases, the PV system decreases grid offtake at a similar rate at times 
during the day when the sun is up. However, from ±12% PV penetration onwards, offtake 
declines less steeply for SLP2. This is because SLP2 is generally consuming less at times 
when PV generation is high, leaving less room for offtake reductions. 
 
 Annual injection: this is calculated using the following formula: 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑘𝑊ℎ) = ∑ 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡(𝑘𝑊ℎ)[𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡 < 0]
𝑡
 
The upper right graph in Figure 2 shows that the threshold for injections is lower for SLP2 
(±7% PV penetration) than for SLP1 (±12% PV penetration). This is because SLP2 
consumption is generally lower during times when PV generation is high. 
 
 Annual grid interaction: this is calculated as the sum of annual offtake and injection. The 
lower left graph in Figure 2 shows the result for varying levels of PV penetration. For both 
profiles, PV systems are shown to allow reduction of the total volumetric grid interaction. 
However, the ability to reduce grid interaction is limited, due to the fact that PV systems 
only generate during the day-time. Hence, there exists a PV penetration level where grid 
interaction is minimal. Due to the same reasons explained above, this level is lower for 
SLP2 (±18% PV penetration) than for SLP1 (±28% PV penetration). In the case of SLP1, 
this translates into a maximum 20% reduction in grid interaction. 
 
 Meter reading (NEM): due to the fact that NEM policies allow for offtake to be offset by 
injection, the end-of-the-year meter reading is computed as follows: 
𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑘𝑊ℎ) = ∑ 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡
𝑡
(𝑘𝑊ℎ) 
This is equivalent to the difference between annual offtake and injection. The lower left 
graph in Figure 2 visualizes the result. It is found that for both consumption profiles, the 
meter reading declines linearly for increasing levels of PV penetration. This is because in 
both cases the annual demand and generation is the same, and because annual generation 
increases linearly with PV penetration. This illustrates the point made in subsection 2.3 
that NEM policies do not account for differences in simultaneity between consumption 
and generation. 
 
 Peak demand reductions: the relative reductions in peak demand during each month m of 
the year 2013 are computed as follows: 
𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚
=  
𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡∈𝑚|𝑃𝑉 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0) − 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡∈𝑚)
𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡∈𝑚|𝑃𝑉 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0)
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Figure 4 summarizes the results for SLP1. It is found that PV generation can only reduce 
monthly peak demand for SLP1, and this is limited to the months April, May, June, July and 
August. Highest possible demand reductions at 100% PV penetration are observed in July 
(±14%). It is also found that, in any month, the highest peak demand reductions are 
reached at ±10% PV penetration. In other words, additional PV system capacity above this 
threshold has little or no added value in reducing peak demand. It is also found that peak 
demand reductions are not possible for SLP2, since peak demand generally occurs during 
night-time. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Characteristics of the generation and consumption profiles. 
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FIGURE 3: Ability of PV systems to reduce peak demand. 
 
C. Tariff Sheets 
The Flemish regulator VREG is responsible for developing a methodology for calculating the 
distribution grid tariffs of the DSOs active in Flanders.8 The DSOs subsequently apply this 
methodology to their own cost structure, and because of both absolute and relative differences in 
this cost structure, the final tariffs may be different. Nevertheless, the overall structure of the 
distribution grid bill is the same for every customer within the same customer category. A 
complete overview of the distribution grid tariffs is available on the website of the regulator 
(VREG, 2015). 
The tariff sheets of the Flemish DSOs are composed of five cost components, as discussed in 
section 2. Each component is then further divided into several sub-components which are all 
reimbursed through an associated tariff driver. Table 1 provides a more accessible summary of 
the prices in € for each tariff driver, for each DSO 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 (𝐼 = {1,2, … ,7}), and for different energy 
flows and types of metering regime. The following tariff drivers are used in Flanders: 
 Energy offtake or injection (€/kWh): 𝛼1(𝑖), 𝛼2(𝑖), 𝛼3(𝑖) 
 Peak demand (€/kW): 𝛽1(𝑖), 𝛽2(𝑖), 𝛽3(𝑖) 
 Installed PV capacity (€/kW): 𝛾1(𝑖), 𝛾2(𝑖), 𝛾2(𝑖) 
 Fixed charge (€/year): 𝛿1(𝑖), 𝛿2(𝑖), 𝛿3(𝑖) 
Note that in Flanders, most costs are recovered on the basis of electric energy offtake, or net-
offtake in the case of net metering. Injection tariffs are generally only applicable to larger DG 
systems (>10 kVA), and require a more advanced meter than the traditional single meter. NEM is 
allowed for all PV systems with a peak capacity ≤10 kVA. Peak metering is normally used by 
professional customers, with a peak demand greater than 56 kVA, and mandatory for any user 
with a peak demand of at least 100 kVA. In this paper, the focus is on residential households. 
However, for the sake of comparison, the household distribution bills are computed using tariffs 
which are normally not applicable to this type of grid user. 
                                                          
8 Up until July 2014, the development of the distribution grid tariff methodology was still a federal affair, 
attributed to the national regulator CREG. 
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TABLE 1: Summary of the distribution grid tariffs (€) in Flanders for offtake and 
injection, and for traditional metering and peak metering. 
 
3.2   Methodology 
Distribution bills are calculated differently depending on the PV policy in place. We consider the 
following policies: 
 Conventional net metering (P1): Under this policy, the user is only receives volumetric 
charges related to offtake, which is measured through a traditional, single meter with net 
metering capability. There is an energy charge and a fixed charge, but no injection tariff. 
The following formula is used to compute the bill: 
 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙(𝐵1) =  𝛼1(𝑖) ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿1(𝑖)       ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼  
 
 Advanced net metering (P2): This is the actual net metering policy in Flanders today. The 
only difference with P1 is an additional tariff based on the capacity of the PV system. The 
following formula is used: 
 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 (𝐵2) = 𝛼1(𝑖) ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛾1(𝑖) ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛿1(𝑖)    ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
 
 Pure offtake policy (P3): Under this policy, the user only pays volumetric charges related 
to offtake, which is measured through an advanced meter registering offtake and injection 
separately. This meter comes at a higher price, and hence leads to higher fixed charges. 
Furthermore, there is no injection tariff. The bill consists of an energy charge and a fixed 
charge, using the following formula: 
 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 (𝐵3) =  𝛼1(𝑖) ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 𝛿3(𝑖)    ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
 
 Injection tariff policy (P4): Here, an advanced meter is installed registering offtake and 
injection separately. The annual offtake is charged at the offtake energy charge, while the 
annual injection is charged with an injection tariff. Furthermore, there is a fixed charge. 
The following formula calculates the bill: 
 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 (𝐵4) =  𝛼1(𝑖) ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 𝛼3(𝑖) ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛿3(𝑖)    ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
GASELWEST IMEA IMEWO INTERGEM IVEKA IVERLEK SIBELGAS
Energy (α1) 0,1330 0,0888 0,1050 0,1002 0,1004 0,1080 0,1196
Peak demand (β1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PV capacity (γ1) 83,99 62,9 70,31 68,27 66,90 71,15 79,16
Fixed (δ1) 9,42 9,42 9,42 9,42 9,42 9,42 9,42
Energy (α2) 0,0572 0,0489 0,0475 0,0487 0,0498 0,0518 0,0602
Peak demand (β2) 118,94 65,61 90,65 80,39 80,71 89,36 94,18
PV capacity (γ2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed (δ2) 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
Energy (α3) 0,005303 0,005708 0,005875 0,006125 0,006388 0,006512 0,009450
Peak demand (β3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PV capacity (γ3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed (δ3) 157,00 157,00 157,00 157,00 157,00 157,00 157,00
OFFTAKE
Traditional 
metering 
(Incl. NEM)
Peak 
metering
INJECTION
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 Peak metering (P5): The volumetric energy charges only account for offtake. There are no 
injection tariffs. Additionally, there is a peak demand tariff, and a higher fixed charge due 
to the advanced metering. The annual tariff for peak demand is calculated on a monthly 
basis, and based on the peak offtake during all the previous months, up to 1 year. This 
translates to the following formula: 
 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 (𝐵5)
= 𝛼2(𝑖) ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 𝛽2(𝑖) ∗ [∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑥(4 ∗ 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑡[𝑡 ∈ 𝑃])
𝑃∈𝜑
]
+ 𝛿2(𝑖)    ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
 
𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝜑 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑃 𝑖𝑛 𝑇
= {(𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 1), (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 1 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 2), (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 1 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 2
+ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 3), … , (𝑎𝑙𝑙 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠)}  
The aim of this paper is to simulate the distribution bill of household consumers under each PV 
policy, and for each load profile and level of PV penetration. Subsequently, the bill savings (PV 
premia) granted to PV systems are calculated. In particular, we consider the following 
combinations: five PV policies, seven different Flemish DSOs and their associated tariffs, two load 
profiles, and PV penetration levels ranging from 0% to 100%. Similarly to Mills (2008), bill savings 
(PV premia) are defined as follows: 
𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 (
€
𝑘𝑊ℎ
) =
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙 [𝑃𝑉 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0] − 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙 [𝑃𝑉 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≠ 0]
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
Bill savings are quantified on a per kWh basis because it is evident that larger systems generate 
more electricity, and therefore lead to greater absolute bill savings under a NEM policy, or greater 
injection tariffs under an injection policy. This notation allows to abstract from the specific 
physical size of the PV system and to focus on relative differences in bill savings. 
 
4. Description of the results 
4.1   Conventional net metering 
Figure 5 visualizes the distribution bill savings resulting from PV generation under a conventional 
NEM policy. It can be observed that the shape of the load profile has no effect on the obtained bill 
savings. This is because the bill is dependent on the meter reading, which does not account for 
differences in temporal correlation between generation and load, as is illustrated in subsection 
3.1 B. Furthermore, since generation increases linearly as a function of PV penetration, and since 
the meter reading decreases linearly as a function of PV penetration, the marginal benefit per kWh 
of additional PV capacity is constant. Note that significant differences in bill savings are observed 
among the different DSOs. This is because the offtake tariffs 𝛼1vary, as depicted in Table 1. 
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FIGURE 5: Bill savings under a conventional NEM policy. 
4.2   Advanced net metering 
Bill savings resulting from an advanced NEM policy are depicted in Figure 6. Similarly to 
conventional NEM, shape of the load profile has no impact, and marginal benefits of PV capacity 
are constant. However, the additional tariff component based on the capacity of the PV system 
significantly decreases the benefit per kWh generated, at each level of PV penetration. Lastly, it 
can be observed that the differences between DSOs are more outspoken than in the case of 
conventional NEM, due to differences in the capacity-based tariff component 𝛾1(Table 1). 
  
FIGURE 6: Bill savings under an advanced net metering policy. 
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4.3   Pure offtake policy 
The potential bill savings under a purely offtake-related distribution grid tariff are depicted in 
Figure 7. It can be observed that bill savings are generally higher for SLP1 than for SLP2. This can 
be explained by the fact that annual offtake is typically lower for SLP1 at all levels of PV 
penetration, due to the increased temporal correlation between consumption and generation. In 
addition, it appears bill savings per kWh are strongly dependent on PV penetration, displaying 
decreasing marginal returns of additional PV capacity beyond a certain threshold. This result 
follows from the observation that annual offtake does not linearly decrease for increasing levels 
of PV penetration. Beyond ±10% PV penetration, some of the PV generation is injected into the 
grid, not further reducing electricity offtake. This does not happen for small levels of PV 
penetration, hence the constant marginal gains from additional PV generation. Note that 
differences in bill savings between DSOs decrease as PV penetration increases. This can be 
explained by the fact that at 100% PV penetration, electricity offtake is minimized. Therefore, 
differences in offtake tariffs (𝛼1) are less outspoken. 
  
FIGURE 7: Bill savings under a pure offtake-related tariff policy. 
4.4   Injection tariff policy 
Figure 8 summarizes the results under a tariff policy combining offtake and injection tariffs. Bill 
savings are higher for SLP1 at each level of PV penetration, due to the better temporal correlation 
with the generation profile. Note that marginal benefits of PV generation decrease from a certain 
threshold. This threshold corresponds to the PV penetration where grid interaction is minimized, 
and is lower for SLP2 than for SLP1. From this threshold, additional  generation has little room for 
further reduction of the annual offtake, instead increasing the annual injection. Note that the 
absolute differences in bill savings are similar to the bill savings under the pure offtake policy, 
because injection tariffs in Flanders (𝛼3) are relatively low compared to offtake tariffs (𝛼1). 
Furthermore, differences in bill savings between different DSOs become smaller as PV penetration 
increases. The reason for this is twofold: on the one hand annual offtake decreases, and 
consequently its impact on the final bill. On the other hand, annual injection increases, but the 
injection tariffs are low enough to nullify this effect on the bill. 
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FIGURE 8: Bill savings under an offtake and injection tariff policy. 
4.5   Peak metering 
The results for the peak metering policy are summarized in Figure 9. Bill savings are higher for 
SLP1, because of two reasons. First, the tariff is partly based on the annual offtake, which depends 
on the shape of the load profile and is higher for SLP2. Second, the tariff is based on monthly peak 
demand, which can be reduced for SLP1, but not for SLP2. At ±10% PV penetration, marginal 
benefits of PV generation decrease because of lower offtake and peak demand reductions. 
  
FIGURE 9: Bill savings under a peak metering policy. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, the electricity distribution bill savings per kWh generated are quantified under 
different tariff policies, and considering different load profiles and PV penetration levels. 
Assuming that the costs of the DSO after installation remain the same, these bill savings constitute 
a premium given to PV users, which is ultimately paid by the remaining consumers. Bill savings 
are computed using the distribution grid tariffs of seven DSOs in the Flanders region in Belgium. 
Results are obtained for an average Belgian residential consumer, and for a residential consumer 
who consumes more during night-time. 
The results suggest that both the conventional and an advanced NEM policy with an additional 
capacity component provide no incentive to adjust the load profile or to scale the PV system in 
such a way that grid interaction and peak demand are reduced. The marginal PV premium per 
kWh generated is constant for increasing levels of PV penetration, despite the fact that beyond a 
certain threshold grid interaction increases and monthly peak demand does not decrease further. 
In other words, if the distribution grid tariffs are high enough, there is an incentive to install PV 
until at least a 100% penetration is reached. Whether or not further integration of PV beyond 
100% is desirable, depends on banking regulations. A tariff component based on the capacity of 
the PV system equally discourages PV installation at each penetration level, including the lower 
levels where potential exists for marginal reductions in grid interaction and monthly peak 
demand. 
In addition, it is found that pure offtake-related policies, mixed offtake and injection policies, and 
policies based on peak demand are better suited to incentivize a PV penetration level that 
minimizes grid interaction and reduces monthly peak demand. This is because marginal benefits 
of installing PV capacity decrease for higher levels of PV penetration. At the same time, tariffs can 
be designed in such a way that the absolute bill savings are similar to a NEM policy for small levels 
of PV penetration. 
The results also suggest that for an average Flemish residential consumer, the ability of PV 
systems to reduce peak demand is limited, both in terms of the frequency and the size of the 
reductions. Even at 100% PV penetration, reductions during the summer period amount to 14%, 
with a PV penetration of approximately 10%. Increasing PV penetration above this threshold does 
not lead to significant marginal peak demand reductions. Similarly, PV systems provide limited 
room to reduce grid interaction. At 28% PV penetration, the average Flemish consumer can 
reduce his grid interaction by 20%. 
It is also found that, if a regulator aims to employ PV systems to reduce peak demand and grid 
interaction, it is preferable to support installation of these systems at the premises of grid users 
with a load profile similar to SLP1. This is because SLP1 exhibits a higher temporal correlation 
with PV generation profiles than SLP2. The findings in this paper further confirm the hypothesis 
that NEM policies do not account for differences in shape of the load profile. 
An important presumption in this paper is the idea that increasing levels of PV penetration have 
no impact on the total cost of the DSO and no impact on the total service volume. In other words, 
distribution grid tariffs are insensitive to changes in installed PV capacity. In order to quantify the 
true size of cross-subsidies between PV-users and pure consumers, one has to account for the 
effect of PV generation on the costs of the DSO. This remains an open topic for further research. 
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